Justification logics are modal-like logics with the additional capability of recording the reason, or justification, for modalities in syntactic structures, called justification terms. Justification logics can be seen as explicit counterparts to modal logics. The behavior and interaction of agents in distributed system is often modeled using logics of knowledge and time. In this paper, we sketch some preliminary ideas on how the modal knowledge part of such logics of knowledge and time could be replaced with an appropriate justification logic.
Introduction
Justification logics are epistemic logics that feature explicit reasons for an agent's knowledge and belief. Originally, Artemov [1] developed the first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs LP, to provide a classical provability semantics for intuitionistic logic. Later, Fitting [11] introduced epistemic models for justification logic. This general reading of justification led to a big variety of epistemic justification logics for many different applications [2, 3, 4, 6, 13, 14, 19, 20] . Instead of an implicit statement Kϕ, which stands for the agent knows ϕ, justification logics include explicit statements of the form [t]ϕ, which mean t justifies the agent's knowledge of ϕ.
A common approach to model distributed systems of interacting agents is using logics of knowledge and time, with the interplay between these two modalities leading to interesting properties and questions [10, 17, 18, 21, 9] . While knowledge in such systems has typically been modeled using the modal logic S5, it is a natural question to ask what happens when we model knowledge in such logics using a justification logic.
This paper offers a first study on combing temporal logic and justification logic. We introduce a system LPLTL CS that combines linear time temporal logic LTL with the justification logic LP. In Sections 2 and 3 we present the language and the axioms of LPLTL CS , respectively. In Section 4 we introduce interpreted systems with Fitting models as semantics for temporal justification logic. In Section 5 we establish soundness and completeness of LPLTL CS . In Section 6 we present an extension LPLTL CS of LPLTL CS that enjoys the internalization property. In Section 7 we introduce some additional principles concerning interactions of knowledge, justifications, and time. In Section 8 we conclude the paper and discuss some open problems.
Axioms
The axiom system for temporal justification logic consists of three parts, namely propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic.
Propositional Logic
For propositional logic, we take 1. all propositional tautologies (Taut)
as axioms and the rule modus ponens, as usual:
Temporal Logic
For the temporal part, we use a system of [12, 15, 16] with axioms
and rules
Justification Logic
Finally, for the justification logic part, we use a multi-agent version of the Logic of Proofs [1, 6, 13, 27] with axioms
where the constant specification CS is a set of formulas [c] i ϕ, where c ∈ Const is a justification constant and ϕ is an axiom of propositional logic, temporal logic, or justification logic. For a given constant specification CS, we use LPLTL CS to denote the Hilbert system given by the axioms and rules for propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic as presented above. As usual, we write LPLTL CS ϕ or simply CS ϕ if a formula ϕ is derivable in LPLTL CS . Often the constant specification is clear from the context and we will only write ϕ instead of CS ϕ.
The axiomatization for linear time temporal logic given in [12, 15, 16] includes an axiom
The following lemma shows that we do not need this axiom since in our formalization is a defined operator.
Lemma 1. We have
and (MP) is the only rule that is used in this derivation.
Proof. ϕ stands for ¬( U ¬ϕ). Hence from ( U 2) we get
Taking the contrapositive yields
By propositional reasoning and (fun) we get
which is
Remark. As usual, we find that the following rule is derivable, see [5, Lemma 6 ] for a detailed derivation,
From this, we get that the following rule is also derivable
A proof is given in [17, Lemma 4.5].
Semantics
In this section we introduce interpreted systems based on Fitting-models as semantics for temporal justification logic.
Definition 2.
A frame is a tuple (S, R 1 , . . . , R h ) where 1. S is a non-empty set of states;
2. each R i ⊆ S × S is a reflexive and transitive relation.
A run r on a frame is a function from N to states, i.e., r : N → S. A system R is a non-empty set of runs.
Definition 3. Given a frame (S, R 1 , . . . , R h ), a CS-evidence function for agent i is a function
satisfying the following conditions. For all terms s,t ∈ Tm, all formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml, and all v, w ∈ S,
4.
Definition 4. An interpreted system for CS is a tuple
2. R is a system on that frame;
3. E i is a CS-evidence function for agent i for 1 ≤ i ≤ h; 4. ν : S → P(Prop) is a valuation.
Definition 5. Given an interpreted system
a run r ∈ R, and n ∈ N, we define truth of a formula ϕ in I at state r(n) inductively by (I , r, n) P iff P ∈ ν(r(n)) ,
for all r ∈ R and n ∈ N such that R i (r(n), r (n )) .
As usual, we write I ϕ if for all r ∈ R and all n ∈ N, we have (I , r, n) ϕ. Further, we write CS ϕ if I ϕ for all interpreted systems I for CS. Remark. From the definitions of and ♦ it follows that:
Soundness and Completeness
The soundness proof for LPLTL CS is a straightforward combination of the soundness proofs for temporal logic and justification logic by induction on the derivation.
Theorem 6. Let CS be an arbitrary constant specification. For each formula ϕ,
Our completeness proof for LPLTL CS follows the one given in [17] . First, we define
Following our convention, we will usually write Γ ϕ instead of Γ CS ϕ.
For a formula χ, let Sub + (χ) := Sub(χ) ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ Sub(χ)}. Let MCS χ denote the set of all maximally CS-consistent subsets of Sub + (χ). We have the following facts for Γ ∈ MCS χ :
• If ϕ ∈ Sub(χ) and ϕ ∈ Γ, then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
• If ϕ ∈ Sub + (χ) and Γ CS ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ.
• If ψ ∈ Sub + (χ), ϕ ∈ Γ and CS ϕ → ψ, then ψ ∈ Γ.
We define the relation R on MCS χ as follows:
From this definition we immediately get the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. Let Γ, ∆ ∈ MCS χ , ΓR ∆, and ϕ ∈ Sub(χ).
Proof.
1. Suppose toward a contradiction that ϕ ∈ ∆. Thus ¬ϕ ∈ ∆. Since Γ CS ϕ, we have
which would contradict ΓR ∆.
2. The proof is similar to part 1.
Lemma 9. Let Γ ∈ MCS χ and let S := {∆ ∈ MCS χ | ΓR ∆}. We have
Proof. First observe that for all Γ, ∆ ∈ MCS χ we have
We also have
By necessitation we get
By (1) we infer Γ → ∆ | ∆ ∈ MCS χ with ΓR ∆ and thus
Lemma 10. The relation R is serial. That is for each Γ ∈ MCS χ , there exists ∆ ∈ MCS χ with ΓR ∆.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that for
and hence,
On the other hand, from (2) we deduce
Since Γ is consistent, (3) and (4) leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 12. For every Γ ∈ MCS χ , if ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ, then there exists a ϕ U ψ-sequence starting with Γ.
Proof. Suppose ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ and there exists no ϕ U ψ-sequence starting with Γ. We let T be the smallest set of elements of MCS χ such that
2. for each ∆ ∈ MCS χ , if ∆ ∈ T , ∆R ∆ , and ϕ ∈ ∆ , then ∆ ∈ T .
We find that ∆ → ¬ψ for all ∆ ∈ T . Let
We have ρ → ¬ψ. Moreover, for each ∆ ∈ T and each ∆ ∈ MCS χ with ∆R ∆ , we have
Thus, by Lemma 9, we get ρ → (ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)). Using ( U -R), we obtain ρ → ¬(ϕ U ψ).
Since Γ ∈ T , this implies Γ → ¬(ϕ U ψ), which contradicts the assumption ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ.
Definition 13. An infinite sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . .) of elements of MCS χ is called acceptable if 1. Γ n R Γ n+1 for all n ≥ 0, and 2. for all n, if ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ n , then there exists m ≥ n such that ψ ∈ Γ m and ϕ ∈ Γ k for all k with n ≤ k < m.
Lemma 14. Every finite sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) of elements of MCS χ with Γ j R Γ j+1 , for all j < n, can be extended to an acceptable sequence.
Proof. In order to fulfill the requirements of Definition 13, we shall extend the sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) by the following algorithm. Suppose ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ 0 . Then either ψ ∈ Γ 0 or ¬ψ ∈ Γ 0 . In the former case the requirement is fulfilled for the formula ϕ U ψ in Γ 0 , and we go to the next step. In the latter case, using axiom ( U 2),
Since Γ 0 R Γ 1 , by Lemma 8, we get ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ 1 .
We can repeat this argument for Γ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We find that the requirement for ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ 0 is either fulfilled in (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) or ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ n and ϕ ∈ Γ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In the latter case, by Lemma 12, there exists a sequence (Γ n , Γ n+1 , . . . , Γ n+m ) such that ϕ ∈ Γ i for n ≤ i < n + m, ψ ∈ Γ n+m , and Γ i R Γ i+1 for n ≤ i < n + m. This gives a finite extension of the original sequence that satisfies the requirement imposed by ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ 0 .
In the next step we repeat this argument for the remaining obligations at Γ 0 . Eventually we obtain a finite sequence that satisfies all requirements imposed by formulas at Γ 0 .
We may move on to Γ 1 and apply the same procedure. It is clear that by iterating it we obtain in the limit an acceptable sequence that extends (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ).
Corollary 15. For every Γ ∈ MCS χ , there is an acceptable sequence that starts with Γ.
Definition 16. The χ-canonical interpreted system
for CS is defined as follows:
1. R consists of all mappings r : N → MCS χ such that (r(0), r(1), . . .) is an acceptable sequence; 2. S := MCS χ = {r(n) | r ∈ R, n ∈ N};
Remark. The χ-canonical interpreted system I for CS is a finite structure in the sense that the set of states S is finite. This is a novelty for completeness proofs of justification logics. Even the completeness proofs for justification logics with common knowledge [2, 6] work with infinite canonical structures. Note that this remark concerns epistemic Fitting-models. Of course, symbolic M-models [22] could be considered as single-world Fitting-models.
The fact that states of I are maximally CS-consistent subsets of Sub + (χ)-instead of just maximally CS-consistent sets-matters for the definitions of R i and E i . The usual definitions would be
This, however, would not work for our finite canonical structure. In particular the next lemma could not be established as, for instance,
for CS is an interpreted system for CS.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the corresponding proof for single agent Fitting-models in [11] . Let us only show here the monotonicity condition for E i .
Suppose Γ, ∆ ∈ S and R i (Γ, ∆). Suppose that ϕ ∈ E i (Γ,t).
Lemma 18 (Truth Lemma). Let I = (R, S, R 1 , . . . , R h , E 1 . . . , E h , ν) be the χ-canonical interpreted system for CS. For every formula ψ ∈ Sub + (χ), every run r in R, and every n ∈ N we have:
(I , r, n) |= ψ iff ψ ∈ r(n).
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. We show only the following cases:
Hence, by definition, ϕ ∈ E i (r(n),t). Now suppose that R i (r(n), r (n )). We find r (n ) ϕ. Since ϕ ∈ Sub + (χ), we have ϕ ∈ r (n ) and by I.H. we get (I , r , n ) |= ϕ. Since r and n were arbitrary, we conclude (I , r, n) |= [t] i ϕ.
• ψ = ϕ. (⇒) Suppose that (I , r, n) |= ϕ and ϕ ∈ r(n). Then (I , r, n + 1) |= ϕ, and hence by the induction hypothesis ϕ ∈ r(n + 1). On the other hand, ¬ ϕ ∈ r(n). Since r(n)R r(n + 1), by Lemma 8, we get ¬ϕ ∈ r(n + 1), which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If ϕ ∈ r(n), then ϕ ∈ r(n + 1). By the induction hypothesis, (I , r, n + 1) |= ϕ, and hence (I , r, n) |= ϕ.
•
, then (I , r, m) |= ψ 2 for some m ≥ n, and (I , r, k) |= ψ 1 for all k with n ≤ k < m. By I.H. we get ψ 2 ∈ r(m), and ψ 1 ∈ r(k) for all k with n ≤ k < m. We have to show ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n), which follows by induction on m as follows: -Base case m = n. Since ψ 2 ∈ r(n) and ψ 2 → (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ), we obtain ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n).
-Suppose m > n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n + 1). From this and r(n)R r(n + 1) we get that
Assume now
Then r(n) ¬(ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) and by axiom ( U 2) we find r(n) ¬(ψ 1 ∧ (ψ 1 U ψ 2 )). From ψ 1 ∈ r(n) we get r(n) ψ 1 and thus r(n) ¬ (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ), which contradicts (5). Hence the assumption (6) must be false and we conclude ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n). (⇐) If ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n), then since (r(n), r(n + 1), . . .) is an acceptable sequence there exists m ≥ n such that ψ 2 ∈ r(m), and ψ 1 ∈ r(k) for all k with n ≤ k < m. By I.H. we obtain (I , r, m) |= ψ 2 , and (I , r, k) |= ψ 1 for all k with n ≤ k < m. Thus (I , r, n) |= ψ 1 U ψ 2 .
Theorem 19 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ,
Proof. Suppose that CS ϕ. Thus, {¬ϕ} is a CS-consistent set. Therefore, there exists Γ ∈ MCS ϕ with ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. By Corollary 15, there is an acceptable sequence starting with Γ. Thus there is a run r in the ϕ-canonical interpreted system I for CS with r(0) = Γ. Since ¬ϕ ∈ Γ, by the Truth Lemma, (I , r, 0) |= ϕ. Therefore, |= CS ϕ.
Internalization
It is desirable that a justification logic internalizes its own notion of proof. This is formalized in the following definition. Usually, internalization is shown by induction on the derivation of ϕ. However, for LPLTL CS this seems not possible because it includes rules ( -nec) and ( -nec). In this section, we introduce an extension LPLTL CS of LPLTL CS that satisfies internalization.
The language of LPLTL CS includes a new unary operator on justification terms. We define 0 c := c and n c := n−1 c (for n ≥ 1) .
The set of terms Tm of LPLTL CS is given by
where c ∈ Const, n ≥ 0, and x ∈ Var. The set of formulas Fml of LPLTL CS is defined like Fml but using Tm instead of Tm.
The axioms of LPLTL CS are:
The rules of LPLTL CS are:
where n ≥ 0; so (ax-nec) subsumes (ax-nec). Note that a constant specification for LPLTL may include formulas of the form
Remark. The principles (mix) and (boxed reflexivity) are derivable in LPLTL CS . However, their proofs require applications of the rules ( -nec) and ( -nec), respectively. Since these rules are not included in LPLTL CS , we have to include (mix) and (boxed reflexivity) as axioms.
Remark. The -operation is very powerful. Its meaning can be explained as follows. If [c] i ϕ is contained in CS, then [c] i ϕ is provable and hence [c] i ϕ is provable, too (see Lemma 22) . The evidence c justifies this fact, i.e., [ c] i [c] i ϕ is provable. Looking closely at (ax-nec) we see that we get even more. Indeed, for any agent j we have that [ c] j [c] i ϕ is provable. Moreover, even arbitrary iterations of this principle are provable, which implies that the constant specification is common knowledge among the agents, so to speak. We could use a less general version of (ax-nec) where the -operation is indexed. This would be similar to the evidence verification operation of [27] , see also Question 2. In that case we would obtain First we show that LPLTL CS extends LPLTL CS .
Lemma 22. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for LPLTL . The rules ( -nec) and ( -nec) are derivable in LPLTL CS .
Proof. We first show that ( -nec) is derivable in LPLTL CS . Suppose ϕ is provable in LPLTL CS . By induction on the proof of ϕ, we show that ϕ is provable in LPLTL CS .
In case ϕ is an axiom, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c such that [c] i ϕ ∈ CS. Using (ax-nec) , we get [ c] i [c] i ϕ, and then using axiom (reflexivity) we get [c] i ϕ. Finally, using axioms (boxed reflexivity) and ( -k) we obtain ϕ.
In case ϕ is derived by modus ponens, the claim is immediate by ( -k).
Then using (reflexivity) we get
Derivability of ( -nec) follows from ( -nec) and axiom (mix).
Let CS be a constant specification for LPLTL . We set
Obviously, CS r is a constant specification for LPLTL. We get the following corollary.
Corollary 23. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for LPLTL . For each formula ϕ of Fml, LPLTL CS r ϕ implies LPLTL CS ϕ.
We will now establish the internalization property. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 24. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For each formula ϕ and each i,
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ. In case ϕ is an axiom, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c with
In case ϕ is derived by modus ponens from ψ → ϕ and ψ, then, by the induction hypothesis, there are term s 1 We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ.
The cases where ϕ is an axiom or ϕ is derived by modus ponens are like the corresponding cases in the previous lemma.
In case ϕ is [ n c] i n . . .
[ c] i 1 [c] i 0 ψ derived using (ax-nec) , we can use (ax-nec) also to obtain n+1 c i ϕ. By Lemma 1 we find LPLTL / 0 ϕ → ϕ. Hence by Lemma 24 there is a term t such that LPLTL CS [t] i ( ϕ → ϕ). We finally conclude
It is straightforward to adapt our semantics for LPLTL CS to the extended language of LPLTL CS . Soundness and completeness of LPLTL CS can then be shown similar to the case of LPLTL CS . However, for the completeness proof of LPLTL CS we require CS to be axiomatically appropriate in order to have the necessitation rules available.
Definition 26. Let CS be a constant specification for LPLTL . A CS-evidence function for agent i for LPLTL is a function E i : S×Tm → P(Fml ) satisfying conditions 1-5 of Definition 3 and the following additional condition:
then for all w ∈ S, all n ≥ 1, and all agents i n−1 , . . . , i 1 :
An LPLTL CS -interpreted system is an interpreted system where we use evidence functions for LPLTL . We write |= CS ϕ to mean I ϕ for all LPLTL CS -interpreted systems I .
Theorem 27 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for LPLTL . For each formula ϕ,
We conclude this section by showing the conservativity of LPLTL over LPLTL. First we need a lemma.
Lemma 28. Let CS be a constant specification for LPLTL, and I be an interpreted system of LPLTL for CS. Then we can extend I to an LPLTL CS -interpreted system I such that for every run r, every n ∈ N, and every formula ϕ ∈ Fml:
(I , r, n) |= ϕ ⇐⇒ (I , r, n) |= ϕ.
Proof. Let I = (R, S, R 1 , . . . , R h , E 1 , . . . , E h , ν) be an arbitrary interpreted system of LPLTL for CS. By a least fixed point construction, we can easily extend the CS-evidence functions E i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ h, to CS-evidence functions E i such that 1. I = (R, S, R 1 , . . . , R h , E 1 , . . . , E h , ν) is an LPLTL CS -interpreted system and 2. for each formula ϕ ∈ Fml, each run r and each n ∈ N:
(I , r, n) |= ϕ ⇐⇒ (I , r, n) |= ϕ . Question 3. What happens if we require operations on justification terms to take time?
We could formalize this idea, e.g., by replacing (application), (sum), and (positive introspection) with
This might also relate to the logical omniscience problem [4] . Question 4. Can dynamic epistemic justification logics be translated into temporal justification logic akin to [9] ?
There are several dynamic justification logics available, e.g., [7, 8, 20, 24] , which feature not only traditional public announcements but also specific forms of evidence based updates and evidence elimination. It would be interesting to see what the relationship between those dynamic logics and temporal justification logic is.
This paper showed a first successful combination of temporal and justification logic. While this initial work shows the feasibility of combining these logics with minimal interaction, the list of questions above shows that various interesting properties may arise from more intricate interactions between justified knowledge and time.
